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MANAGING PARTNERSHIP RELATIONS AND CONTRACTUAL 
PERFORMANCE IN THE OPERATING PHASE OF PUBLIC PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIP: INTERVIEW FINDINGS 
Steven McCann, Guillermo Aranda-Mena and Peter J. Edwards 
ABSTRACT 
The public partner has a governance responsibility in the operational phase of Public 
Private Partnership projects. It must ensure that contracted services provided by pri-
vate consortia are delivered and that specified delivery standards are met. The public 
partner thus has to manage the relationship with, and the performance of, its private 
partner. Literature review is used to identify operational issues relating to partnership 
and performance management. These are then explored through interviews with 34 sen-
ior public and private partner industry representatives from Australia and the United 
Kingdom. Partnership issues relate to: organisational culture; management commit-
ment and support; employee capability and expertise; and conflict management. For 
performance management, the relevant issues are: key performance indicator modifica-
tion; contract variation; and penalties and abatements. The interview findings show 
that effective management of these issues by the public partner will increase the likeli-
hood that intended Value-for-Money outcomes are achieved in Public Private Partner-
ship. 
Keywords - Operational Governance, Partnership Management, Performance Man-
agement, PPP, Public Partner, Value-for-Money 
INTRODUCTION 
Although there is no universally accepted definition, for the purposes of this paper, Pub-
lic Private Partnership (PPP) is characterised as a collaborative endeavour (Smyth and 
Edkins 2006) involving public and private partners, developed through the expertise of 
each partner in order to meet identified public needs through appropriate resource, risk 
and reward allocation (Canadian Council for Public Private Partnerships 2009). The 
traditionally long-term nature of PPPs (often upwards of 20 years) means that manage-
ment, beyond the development and delivery phases, of the partnership itself and of the  
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performance of the private partner, is likely to be important to the success of a PPP pro-
ject in terms of delivering Value-for-Money (VfM) to the public. 
As with PPP, there is no single definition that fully encapsulates the concept of ‘VfM’. 
For the private partner, it may simply represent the size of its profit margins, and hence 
return on investment, in delivering contracted services. For government, however, VfM 
is based on the delivery of planned social outcomes. It is a mantra of contemporary pub-
lic government and public administration. 
Within context of this paper, VfM denotes: 
‘A balanced benefit measure covering quality levels, performance standards, risk 
exposure, other policy or special interest measures, as well as price. Generally, 
VfM is assessed on a “whole of life” or “total cost of ownership” basis’ (Victorian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2011, p.19). 
While many governments have substantial experience in the development and imple-
mentation of PPP projects, there is probably a corresponding lack of maturity in terms 
of effective approaches to achieving VfM outcomes during the operational phase of 
PPPs. This is because many projects are still only in the early years of their concession 
periods, and the metrics for, and assessment of, the longer-term success of PPP projects 
is not yet fully understood. 
PPP concessions are generally formalised through complex contractual agreements be-
tween the public and private partners. Sub-contracts determine the roles, contributions 
and behaviours that are expected from the separate parties that consort to form the pri-
vate partner. However, as no contract will cover every eventuality of something going 
wrong, effective ongoing partnership relations between the public and private partners 
are important for dealing with unforeseen issues as and when they arise. 
Operational complexity occurs as the constituent parties of the private partner may 
change over time (e.g. if loan finance transfers to a new lender). The public partner may 
also introduce change to the PPP, e.g. by transferring contract administration and man-
agement to a different government agency. Re-negotiation of the concession agreement 
occurs if the partners contemplate changes in the scope of the PPP, such as the widening 
of, or extension to a toll road. These factors each affect relationships between the PPP 
partners and the public partner’s capacity to manage the performance of its private part-
ner. 
Relationship and performance management issues, in the operational phase of PPP, 
were explored through interviews conducted with 34 representatives from the public 
and private sectors. The interview findings are reported here. First, a short contextualis-
ing literature review, covering partnership management and performance management, 
is presented. This is followed by an account of the interview administration and inter-
viewee demographics. The findings are then presented, together with analysis and dis-
cussion. Recommendations for practice in public sector governance during the operating 
phase of PPP are made. 
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LITERATUR REVIEW 
Partnership Management 
Partnership management is: ‘a relationship involving the sharing of power, work, sup-
port and/or information with others for the achievement of joint goals and/or mutual 
benefits’ (Kernaghan in Trafford and Proctor 2006). The partnership issues pertaining to 
PPP include: organisational culture; management commitment and support; employee 
capability and expertise; and conflict management. 
Organisational culture: 
Weihe (in Hodge, Greve and Boardman 2010, p.520) asserts that, in order to achieve 
VfM outcomes, co-operative relationships between partners must be established. Un-
cooperative working environments (Klijn and Teisman 2003) can lead to operational 
difficulties between partners. Therefore, partnerships should be based on establishing 
the ‘right’ working culture (Edwards, Bowen and Stewart 2005; National Audit Office 
2009, p.55) that is beneficial to both partners; and then maintaining good relations over 
the life of the contract (Partnerships Victoria 2003, p.16; AECOM 2007, p.75). 
Developing good working relationships between partners can decrease the amount of 
corrective action (e.g. abatement) that might otherwise be needed to improve contract 
management outcomes (Ernst & Young 2008, p.13). Their study points to a significant 
advantage in creating cohesive relations between the partners: building such relations 
may improve long-term prospects of partnership outcomes thus avoiding, where possi-
ble, ‘restrictive’ and ‘mechanical’ administrative practices that may rely too heavily on 
specific wording of contracts (2008, p.13) rather than trying to achieve better mutually 
agreed outcomes by engaging their opposite partner more effectively. This is important 
because the ‘end goal’ for PPPs is not cost reduction (i.e. simply abating for under-
performance) – it is ensuring the private partner performs to the agreed standards under 
the contract (HM Treasury 2011, p.15) and that VfM is being delivered as expected. 
The National Audit Office in the United Kingdom (2009, p.54) (UK) goes further in 
claiming that poor relationships and unsatisfactory performance go ‘hand in hand’. For 
instance, that poorly motivated staff are less likely to strive to meet tightly scheduled 
milestones or Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) and may result in penalties or abate-
ment being applied to service providers for failing to meet performance targets. 
Importantly, public sector employees, including those who work in PPP projects are 
required, when engaged in commercial transactions, to adhere to public sector codes of 
conduct and applicable standards (e.g. finance legislation) and are accountable to gov-
ernment, i.e. Parliament and subject to examination by Auditors-General for their deci-
sion-making (E W Russell & Associates 2000, pp.80-81). Such expectations and ac-
countabilities may constrain the use of informality and innovation in the development of 
good relationships between the PPP partners. 
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Management commitment and support: 
In public partner governance of PPPs, senior public managers will control the deploy-
ment of the resources needed e.g. finance, manpower, information or other technology 
(Cheng, Li and Love 2000; Hope 2012) to detect or address under-performance in the 
delivery of services. Senior management commitment and support is thus essential for 
VfM achievement. 
Employee capability and expertise: 
A lack of public sector governance staff capability or expertise (Hope 2012) can lead to 
tensions between public and private partners, and eventually to service delivery under-
performance (as deficiencies in expertise may be exploited by the private partner). High 
quality public partner contract management skills are needed to ensure satisfactory VfM 
outcomes (Edwards et al 2004, p.63). However, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2007, p.20) claims that appropriate corporate experience 
among government employees is in short supply. The capability constraint may arise at 
any stage in the PPP life-cycle, but clearly has the potential to become acute during the 
longer time span of the operational phase. Lack of staff, inadequate expertise or experi-
ence, poor staff development, frequent transfer of personnel and lack of appropriate 
succession planning can each critically affect effective operational management. 
Conflict management: 
Conflict between public and private partners may be inevitable (Edwards et al 2004, 
p.55), arising from disagreements over timeframes, costs and quality issues (Leung et al 
2004). Other factors can include: project priorities (Hope 2012); manpower resources 
(e.g. a lack of skills to deliver services to agreed standards); and personality conflicts 
(e.g. personal or professional differences between individuals and which are primarily 
task-driven or people-focused). Conflicting interpretation of contract requirements may 
occur, due to individual or organisational biases or preferences (Cambridge Economic 
Policy Associates 2005, pp.34-35). Any of these conflicts can be exacerbated by the 
long-term operational nature of PPPs, and long-standing conflicts tend to resist success-
ful resolution. 
Performance Management 
Performance management comprises ‘the use of inter-related strategies and activities to 
improve the performance of individuals, teams and organisations’ (Management Advi-
sory Committee 2001: p.14). For PPPs, performance management issues identified re-
late to: KPI modification; contract variation; and penalties and abatements. 
KPI modification: 
The fulfilment of organisational objectives is inextricably linked to effective perfor-
mance management. Optimum levels of performance are generally not prescribed by 
public sector agencies (see, for example, the national Australian PPP guidelines pub-
lished by Infrastructure Australia). 
Steven McCann, Guillermo Aranda-Mena and Peter J. Edwards 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 15, Iss. 2, 2014 
 www.ipmr.net  115 IPMR
KPIs should be relevant, reliable and accurate (Partnerships Victoria 2003, p.131). 
Poorly defined KPIs can lead to failure (Evans and Bellamy 1995). KPIs should be re-
viewed regularly in conjunction with the private partner. 
Contract variation: 
Contract clauses may be modified from time-to-time by mutual agreement between the 
parties. Original designs and intentions are unlikely to survive intact the changes in de-
mands and technologies occurring over spans of twenty years or more. Variations (in-
cluding re-allocating risks) may be justifiable in terms of technical obsolescence (e.g. 
tolling systems); new legal/political requirements (e.g. health and safety; changes in 
service user demand) (Partnerships Victoria 2001, p.135; Edwards et al 2004, p.122); 
from decisions to modify the length of agreements as a result of scope change; and for 
private partner under-performance (Partnerships Victoria 2001, p.161). 
In the case of under-performance, the public partner will normally reserve the right to 
intervene if the quality of services provided by the private partner fails to meet its obli-
gations (Partnerships Victoria 2001, p.161). This could arise from a breach of contract 
such as default (through continued acts of non-compliance) (Partnerships Victoria 2001, 
p.148); through major default (such as insolvency); or in an emergency where the public 
partner may assume operational control for a period of time because the situation may 
be beyond the capability of the private partner to deal with it effectively (Partnerships 
Victoria 2001, p.161). The public partner must be aware of, and plan for, the possibility 
of intervention. 
Penalties and abatements: 
Only a small percentage of PPP projects in the UK have been subject to penalties ap-
plied for under-performance (National Audit Office 2009, p.56). In practice, penalties 
may be deferred to improve working relationships between the partners (or to prevent 
them from deteriorating further) or to off-set under-performing services with other ser-
vices rendered (National Audit Office 2009, p.56).The threat of applying abatement 
may spur the private partner to improve its performance (Ernst & Young 2008, p.13). 
The relevant issues of partnership and performance management in the operational 
phase of PPP are now explored in greater depth, using interviews conducted with ap-
propriate experts from the public and private sectors. 
RESEARCH METHOD AND ADMINISTRATION 
The primary objective of the research was to examine how PPP operational phase part-
nership, performance and risk management practices can be improved to achieve better 
VfM outcomes. This involved developing a generic conceptual integrating model as a 
tool (that could support a contract administration manual) to assist government deci-
sion-makers to allocate and make better use of public sector resources during the operat-
ing phase of PPPs that may have significant and/or long-term consequences for achiev-
ing strategic public policy objectives. 
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The research methodology is phenomenological, and divides into two main phases us-
ing qualitative mixed methods, commencing with literature review to facilitate the ini-
tial conceptualisation of the proposed model. Semi-structured interviews were then used 
to gather primary data. From this data analysis, a second iteration of the model was pre-
pared and presented to an expert focus group for scrutiny and comment. Feedback from 
this group was used to refine the final iteration of the model. 
This paper focuses on the interview findings, relating to partnership, performance and 
risk management, used in the development of the second integrating model. 
The interviews were conducted between October 2012 and March 2013 to explore the 
presence and nature of the issues identified by literature review findings. Purposive 
sampling was used to distribute invitations to fifty people, from the public and/or pri-
vate sectors, with experience in PPP. Thirty-four (68% response rate) agreed to partici-
pate in the interview process. Two thirds of the participants were from the public sector 
and one third from the private sector. Two of the public sector participants were inter-
viewed as a ‘pilot study’ to confirm the completeness of the semi-structured interview 
format. 
The adequacy of the sample size for this research was determined retrospectively 
through identifying the ‘saturation point’ i.e. whereby saturation occurs when no new 
significant issues and diversity of answers are revealed during subsequent interviews. 
This point was revealed through categorisation and analysis of the interview transcript 
data, e.g. by comparing and contrasting the content to reveal the possibility of develop-
ing new issues. 
The majority of the public sector interviewees were project directors. They have respon-
sibility for the long-term administration of the public partner’s interests in a PPP. Others 
included senior executives from central agencies, government departments and statutory 
authorities; a commercial manager; as well as a small number of PPP contract managers 
and a contract administrator. The purposive sample was drawn from eligible persons 
from the Australian Government, three Australian state jurisdictions and the UK Gov-
ernment. 
Selected private sector participants included senior executives and managers responsible 
for PPP service delivery; project engineers; and partners from top-tier advisory and le-
gal firms. Many of these participants have substantial experience working in Australian 
and international PPP markets. 
The interviews comprised 15 meetings (40%) dealing with partnership management, 10 
meetings (26%) about risk management and 13 meetings (34%) for performance man-
agement: 38 interviews in total. The difference between the number of interviewees and 
the total number of interviews arises because some participants agreed to be interviewed 
twice. Although risk management was initially treated as a separate area of management 
for PPP, the risk-related interview material was subsequently subsumed into partnership 
and performance management, given that risk is pervasive for all aspects of PPP. 
For the public sector, 11 interviewees (29%) spoke about partnership management, six 
(16%) about risk management and nine (24%) about performance management. From 
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the private sector, 12 (30%) participants spoke about their experiences (four interviews 
each per management discipline). 
The interview administration demographics, comprising interviewee identification code, 
interview duration and distinction between public and private sector PPP representation, 
are shown in Table 1. Abbreviations in identification codes are as follows: pilot study 
(PS); partnership management focus (PT); risk management focus (RK); and perfor-
mance management focus (PF). Over 42 hours of interviews were conducted and rec-
orded, with an average interview length of 67 minutes. 
Table 1: Interview administration demographics 
Reference 
number 








PS03^ Public Senior Manager 60 - 
PS04^ Public Contract Manager 60 - 
PT01-PT02 Private Senior Manager (both) 90 RK03 
PT03 Public Director 75 RK05 
PT04 Public Executive Director 45* RK08 
PT05 Public Deputy Secretary 60 - 
PT06 Public Director 60 RK11 
PT07 Public Director 60 - 
PT08 Public Director 90 - 
PT09 Private Partner 60 - 
PT10 Public Director 55 PF08 
PT11 Public Director 75 - 
PT12 Private Group Executive 75 - 
PT13 Private Partner 75 - 
PT14 Public Director 60 PF13 
RK01-RK02 Public General Manager (both) 60 - 
RK03 Private Senior Manager 90 PT01 
RK04 Private Group Executive 60 - 
RK05 Public Director 75 PT03 
RK06 Private Partner 60 PF01 
RK07 Public Director 75 - 
RK08 Public Executive Director 25* PT04 
RK09 Public Director 90 - 
RK10 Private Partner 75 - 
RK11 Public Director 60 PT06 
PF01 Private Partner 60 RK06 
PF02 Private Director 60 - 
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Reference 
number 








PF03-PF04 Public Director (both) 90 - 
PF05 Private General Manager 75 - 
PF06 Public Commercial Manager 60 - 
PF07 Public Contract Administrator 75 - 
PF08 Public Director 35 PT10 
PF09 Public Contract Manager 75 - 
PF10 Private Partner 60 - 
PF11 Public Director 75 - 
PF12 Public Director 75 - 
PF13 Public Director 60 PT14 
PF14 Public Director 60 - 
^PS03 and PS04 –Transcripts for these pilot interviews were included as part of the partnership manage-
ment data set. 
*Two additional interviews were conducted immediately after the primary interviews took place, in a 
single session, hence the shorter duration. 
The NVivo version 10 software application was used to conduct a thematic analysis of 
transcript data to identify important themes, using a hierarchical data coding process of 
‘parent’ nodes (open codes); and ‘child’ nodes (axial codes). See Appendix 1 for the 
nodes created for each of the issues and sub-issues. This presents an overview of part-
nership, performance and risk management categorisation and provides the basis for 
developing the main themes for these topics. 
FINDINGS 
Selected findings from the interview data analysis are presented under the management 
factor headings derived from the literature. 
Organisational culture: 
Interviewees associate with one of two practical approaches for PPP contract oversight: 
‘give and take’ relationship management and ‘letter of the law’ contract enforcement. 
The ‘give and take’ approach accords with an organisational culture that places a pre-
mium on quality of the contract management function as well as embracing a solutions-
based approach (PT03; PT13) fostered through a strong belief in the value of relation-
ship management (PF07; PF01) – one where partners are likely to be flexible (PT05) 
and pull together for mutual benefit when things go wrong or when unexpected issues 
arise (PT13; PT03). 
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This contrasts with a ‘letter of the law’ approach which is likely to manifest in a strong 
compliance-orientated culture. According to PF06, establishing such a culture is ac-
ceptable if government is ‘100 per cent’ certain that the contract is correct; however, in 
practice, this is unlikely to be the case as the interviewee acknowledges that there is 
often room for wider interpretation in contractual clauses. 
Despite the goodwill that can be generated by PPP partners and the co-operative inten-
tions they may have, it is also argued that ‘you get what you pay for’, i.e. that money 
drives behaviour (RK01). This suggests that organisational culture may not always be 
driven primarily by the preferred contract management style of the public partner, but 
could be influenced by the size of the private partner’s financial margins, which in turn 
could then influence the extent to which consortia may ‘go the extra mile’ (or perhaps 
alternatively, the degree to which ‘corners could be cut’ by the private partner). The 
wider point is elucidated by PF13: 
‘If you’ve got a deal where the private [partner] is basically making dollars but is 
still delivering VfM, then there’s probably a greater willingness to do things to-
gether. But if the assumptions that the private [partner] has made around the cost 
of delivering the services and the services are actually under pressure and it be-
comes a bit of a loss, then their motivation to work in flexible ways is going to 
diminish.’ 
These types of difficulties could also be exacerbated, for instance, by budgetary pres-
sures and changing departmental priorities that can impact on the quality of the public 
partner’s contract management function, e.g. where cost-cutting may lead to the re-
placement of highly qualified staff by less skilled and less experienced employees. As a 
consequence, the dynamics of the relationship between the parties may change. Strate-
gic relationships may even become a routine administrative process (PF07; PT03). 
Management commitment and support: 
A concern is raised about aspects of public sector departmental oversight, e.g. where 
PPP working committees (PT14; PF09) could be more supportive of the contract man-
agement function (PF07). In order to obtain better VfM outcomes, contract management 
teams should be provided with adequate resources, such as increased funding to employ 
suitably qualified staff who, in addition to managing routine contract management func-
tions, have the ability to respond appropriately to strategic risks and opportunities 
(PT03). Not only is this an intra-departmental concern for the public partner with re-
spect to providing the right level of funding for its contract management teams, it also 
extends to commitment and support from treasury and finance departments that approve 
agency budget allocations. In discussing public partner under-resourcing, PF04 implicit-
ly points to a possible source of power imbalance between PPP partners: 
‘We put in a lot of resources into doing the deal and you know that the private 
[partner] in the operational phase has its lawyers, its accountants and it is very 
conscious of its cost structures and all that, and we’re trying to manage with rela-
tively cheap junior staff and without lawyers and accountants backing you up… 
[we cannot afford those types of] resources.’ 
Managing Partnership Relations and Contractual Performance in the Operating Phase of Public Private Partnership: Interview 
Findings 
 
 International Public Management Review  Vol. 15, Iss. 2, 2014 
 www.ipmr.net  120 IPMR
In contrast, PT10 offers a different perspective: 
‘In the first year of operations, the [payment] commitment was 100 million dollars 
to the private partner for service, for maintenance and for the assets being deliv-
ered. We should be managing that with quality resources and we should have 
funding for the right personnel to do it.’ 
Several interviewees (PF03; PF04; PT05; PF08; PF07) emphasise that Australian de-
partments of treasury and finance ought to engage more closely with, and provide better 
levels of support and funding to, host departments (i.e. the ‘nominal’ client) for contract 
management. Reality might dictate that choices are made in terms of budget priorities, 
but if genuine VfM outcomes are to be achieved, resources must be allocated to PPP 
projects that will increase the likelihood that services will be delivered as intended and 
that expectations, as set out in business cases, are met. The other side of this coin is that 
public departments that manage PPPs have a responsibility to relay accurate information 
to the relevant treasury and finance departments in order to improve informed decision-
making for future projects (PT05). 
Employee capability and expertise: 
The profile of the public partner’s PPP management workforce typically comprises a 
mixture of permanent and temporary internal employees and private sector contractors 
and consultants (externals) that are engaged on a fixed-term basis to augment available 
skill-sets. PT14 asserts that, in some cases, there is potential to improve VfM proposi-
tions e.g. through productivity efficiencies and capability building by using highly 
skilled contractors and consultants to fulfil specific requirements or to deal with particu-
lar issues. However, a potential risk for the public partner of relying too heavily on ex-
ternal contractors and consultants is that they may not adequately (or even be requested 
to) transfer appropriate technical knowledge to public employees (PT05), nor act in a 
timely way, which may result in the public partner paying high market rates for longer 
than necessary or being left unexpectedly to deal with skills-gaps if the external provid-
ers should leave suddenly. It is important that the public partner develops an appropriate 
level of in-house expertise at an individual PPP project level to lessen the impact of 
such risks. PT05 opines: 
‘Corporate knowledge and continuity of that corporate knowledge [needs] to be 
maintained [better]…the current structure within the Victorian government 
doesn’t recognise and give enough value to that.’ 
Apart from providing formal learning opportunities, on the job training, opportunities 
for attending contract management forums and other types of professional development 
(PT08; PT03; PT10) for employees to improve their commercial, legal and negotiating 
knowledge and skills, etc (PT05; PF12; PT04; RK07; PT03), the public partner can bol-
ster its contract management capabilities by: 
 Developing better knowledge continuity between project phases e.g. by having 
an operations specialist involved in procurement and delivery decision-making 
and for understanding the key background issues and relationships (PT04; 
PT10; PF13); 
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 Creating and maintaining a document library for corporate and commercial 
documents (PT10; PF08; PT11; PS04) e.g. through a single online repository; 
 Applying its contract management/administration manual more effectively and 
ensuring its currency (PF13; PT14); 
 Improving succession planning (PT10; PF07) and the hand-over process more 
generally, including intellectual property matters (PT12); and 
 Implementing and maintaining a detailed ‘calendar of deliverables’ tool, based 
on contractual outputs, for monitoring performance (PF12). 
In addition to improving employee capability and knowledge management within indi-
vidual PPP projects, interviewees (PT10; PF12; PF04; PF11; PT03; PF06; RK10; PT13; 
PT12) discussed the potential of the public sector to develop economies of scale across 
multiple projects. Interviewee PF11 points to a failure of successive governments, to 
take a long-term view of contracted PPPs including committing resources needed to 
truly understand the commonalities that exist across projects, especially those that could 
ultimately improve quality outcomes and drive down recurrent expenditure. With regard 
to the current role of the Victorian Department of Treasury and Finance in relation to 
the PPP project operating phase, PT10 comments: 
‘Treasury is an absolutely critical stakeholder but are they well geared to manag-
ing or facilitating that pool, that resource, or that function? Their traditional role is 
being…the source of advice around, not just budget settings, but procurement and 
risk. Don’t confuse it with service delivery – absolutely be a stakeholder, be an 
owner or be a client for that but not the source or host for that type of thing.’ 
Supporting this view, PF12, PF06 and RK10 see value in the creation of a centralised 
public sector agency model for managing PPP business, i.e. a dedicated business unit 
that would manage the spectrum of PPP agreements and contracts, thus making it easier 
to develop the requisite depth of employee knowledge and capability in a more struc-
tured and standardised way, whilst reducing the costs that may otherwise be paid to ex-
pensive contractors and consultants to deliver similar management requirements across 
a number of projects. Although this may be a potentially effective solution in principle, 
there is a challenge over how such a unit would be governed in practice. For instance, 
PF04 raises questions about how the unit might relate to individual departmental and 
statutory authority heads who have responsibility under financial management acts for 
activities within their portfolio and who would be given precedence in decision-making. 
The feasibility of such a unit could be further complicated by a lack of critical mass of 
PPP projects within individual Australian jurisdictions; there may not be sufficient skill-
sets to develop and then maintain necessary expertise (PF04) due to the small number of 
projects currently in the pipeline – unless such a unit were to be established at the feder-
al government level and given responsibility for all projects across all states and territo-
ries (PT13). Contemporary political realities in Australia suggest that transfer of all re-
sponsibility for PPP management to federal level would not be regarded favourably by 
all state and territory authorities. 
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Conflict management: 
Notwithstanding the potential benefits of the ‘give and take’ contract management ap-
proach postulated by interview participants, conflict is almost certain to occur during a 
25 to 30 year concession period. Broadly speaking, two key sources of conflict are iden-
tified by interviewees (PT05; PF04; PF12; PT06; RK11; PT03; PT11; PT14; PF13; 
PT13; PF10). 
The first source of conflict relates to situations that arise where there is potential for 
significant financial impacts/unforeseen cost burdens that can shape public partner VfM 
outcomes. Examples of these types of disputes, relating particularly to the delivery of 
services for social infrastructure projects, occur where: 
 the public partner rigidly applies abatement for delay or under-performance 
during the transition phase into operations i.e. when systems and processes are 
still being bedded-down which results in push-back by the private partner 
(PT14); 
 decisions taken by the state hinder the private partner in some way e.g. double-
bunking in prison cells due to overcapacity that leads to higher operational 
costs (such as energy consumption) being absorbed by the private partner 
(PT11); and 
 where there is non-performance or under-performance by the private partner 
for the delivery of defined services (PT05). 
The second source of conflict relates to failure of one party to meet the expectations of 
the other where: 
 the intent of a service specification has been misunderstood; or  
 where a KPI has not been adequately defined (PT05; PT11).  
Put differently, disputes can occur because the private partner has a different under-
standing of the service it is supposed to be delivering (PT06) or how wording contained 
in contractual clauses should be interpreted. Different perceptions and interpretations 
can therefore have a profound effect on achieving VfM outcomes where the ‘word’ can 
outlive the ‘intent’ in agreements (PT13; PF12; PT12). PF04 provides the following 
example: 
‘We [currently] have a case in the Full Court of the Supreme Court over which fo-
rum should hear a dispute about whether “may” means “must”. Yes, it’s pedantic 
but it’s the kind of detail that we’re spending hundreds of thousands of dollars, in 
our case, to find out.’ 
Before enacting formal dispute resolution mechanisms, partners should make sufficient 
attempts to resolve the issue (PT05) and at least develop a shared understanding of what 
the facts are and what the consequences should be under the contractual framework 
(PT03). The degree to which the partners are able to do this may come down to the type 
(or quality) of relationship that the partners have (PT03) and the level of confidence and 
capability that public partner employees possess in dealing with their private partner 
counterparts (PT05). Within this context, RK11 believes that having the right experi-
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ence can be crucial to achieving good outcomes as less experienced employees tend to 
seek expensive legal advice too often, without first considering what the public part-
ner’s position should be and attempting to reach that desired outcome through negotia-
tion with the private partner. Furthermore, the legal opinion offered may not actually 
address the problem at hand, but instead is geared towards a view of what lawyers think 
the court would take if it had to answer the question (PT13). PF12 has a similar opinion: 
‘If [contract managers] rely too heavily on legal advice to interpret clauses, it will 
be costly and they might get advice that’s not always in their best interests. A con-
tract is a guide and if contract managers need an additional guide to interpret the 
guide, then they’re in trouble.’ 
KPI modification: 
Operational KPIs are developed during the procurement phase. This means that they 
tend to be designed, often by lawyers and project teams that have limited operational 
experience, at a time when the least amount of information is known about the service 
delivery specifics of PPPs (PF10; PF12). It is therefore important to have flexibility 
(PF08) between the partners to review KPIs to ensure that the services being delivered 
actually match what was intended as part of the original business case (PF05). Such 
flexibility then allows the partners to take steps to address consequential misalignment 
between expectation and practice. Moreover, if KPIs are not well constructed, it may be 
difficult for the public partner to hold its private partner to account for under-
performance (PT06): 
‘If the KPIs are [ineffective], then you’re going to have trouble holding [the pri-
vate partner] accountable, without doubt… If you get that wrong, if you don’t 
have people that are of the calibre that you need, you pay for it big time in PPPs.’ 
Modifying KPIs usually means they can be adjusted to their ‘right’ level (PF12). How-
ever, the extent to which the modification contributes towards the achievement of VfM 
may depend upon a range of factors including: the timing of negotiations; how much 
leverage the public partner has over its private partner; and the level of employee ability 
to broker the best deal for the public partner. As PF02 explains: 
‘When you’re modifying an existing contract [or specification], you’re doing it 
non-competitively. As government, you’re going to have to test and look really 
closely at what’s changing and what the value was that you were getting... It [al-
so] depends on the balance of power in a particular negotiation. If the [private 
partner] is bleeding, and if they need you to do something to avoid some kind of 
default, then you might have the negotiating advantages as the public [partner], 
whereas if you’re under specified performance, then the negotiating leverage is on 
the other foot. It just depends on where the balance of power lies.’ 
Contract variation: 
Contracts get varied due to changes in scope (RK11). Variations may therefore be 
sought and agreed because:  
 something is found to be technically wrong in the contract (RK02);  
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 expectations do not match the nature of agreed outputs (RK05);  
 there are changes in law or government policy (RK10);  
 there is a need to introduce an additional service (RK11); or  
 there is an opportunity to ‘future-proof’ existing assets (PF04; RK05) e.g. to 
meet rising/projected service demand. 
For the public partner, regardless of the driver of a variation, a crucial factor in achiev-
ing VfM is the ability of its employees to effectively assess and select the best course of 
action, and not inadvertently (through failing to understand the commercial and legal 
underpinnings of the concession deed) give away ‘something which undermines value 
for the state over the longer-term or which leads to [an adverse] change in [its] risk pro-
file’ (PT14). Inadequate levels of skills and experience (see ‘Employee capability and 
expertise’, above) can therefore have a detrimental effect on achieving desired outcomes 
through planning for and administering contract variations (PF12). This can be further 
compounded by having to deal with uncertainty (e.g. ‘unknowns’) when trying to fu-
ture-proof assets, e.g. when arising from unexpected changes or a rapid pace in techno-
logical advancement (PF04) or population growth (RK05). 
Only four interview participants (RK11; PF14; PT12; PF10) provided in-depth insights 
into risk re-allocation between partners. It appears that this is not currently a significant 
concern for Australian PPPs (even though there are numerous examples of ‘failed’ ven-
tures – most notably toll roads – stemming arguably from the use of contemporary de-
mand risk allocation and demand forecasting models). Within an Australian context, 
RK11 asserts that the most likely scenario involving the state taking back risk or alter-
ing the contract during operations (in terms of facility management) would be due to 
mispricing the provision of ‘soft’ services e.g. catering, cleaning and other people ser-
vices, where the public partner is faced with a choice between re-negotiating the deal or 
permitting the operator to walk away from the contract (or go into voluntary administra-
tion or liquidation). 
However, anecdotal evidence emerging from the UK suggests that, in some instances, 
public partners in PPP projects are deciding to take-back risks associated with the provi-
sion of soft services (PF14; PT12; PF10) particularly in schools, whilst allowing the 
private partner to continue to maintain and operate the assets. PF14 explains why: 
‘A review of [PPP] was undertaken in 2012. It concluded that there is [little] value 
in [the private partner providing] soft services…These types of services should be 
decided on a case-by-case basis but people have tended to add them in without 
much consideration. The exceptions are health because it’s heavily union-
ised…and you’re buying services and not just an asset…and prisons which have 
complete services including rehabilitation and training. It’s not practical with 
schools because the soft services aren’t intensive and the schools are small and 
typically only need a part-time caretaker’. 
Penalties and abatements: 
Although abatement (including the threat of abatement) can be an effective method for 
driving private partner behaviour (PF13) by providing a strong incentive to perform 
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under the contractual framework (PT06), interviewees PT06, PT10 and PF07 reason 
that the decision to apply abatement for under-performance is a matter of professional 
judgement. For example, in the experience of PT10, abatement should only be applied if 
there is an intractable problem between the partners, i.e. after all reasonable avenues for 
resolving the issue have been exhausted. Although this may be a contentious view (see 
‘Organisational culture’, above), PT06 provides context in support of PT10’s perspec-
tive: 
‘If you know that the [private partner] is doing everything he can to alleviate or 
address whatever issues are cropping up, then why would you abate, even if 
you’re entitled to under the contract? It doesn’t serve any purpose. You have a 
right to abate, and…the state has a very big stick, but you want to use it wisely. If 
you abate them, it hurts them financially but the relationship is important and it’s 
about give and take’. 
In other words, knowing when to apply abatement and when to allow flexibility can be 
strategically important with respect to building and maintaining effective partnership 
relations (PF13; PF07; PF02; RK05; RK11). Moreover, there is some anecdotal evi-
dence within Australia that, instead of applying abatement, partners do deals to off-set 
under-performance, for instance where the private partner may informally consent to do 
other things to compensate (PT04; PF02) such as agreeing to scope changes (PT04). 
However, taking these types of decisions is likely to reduce transparency in decision-
making (PF02) as well as reduce the effectiveness of threatening abatement for future 
instances of under-performance (PT04). Other consequences of such decision-making 
may manifest in informal precedent being claimed (PF13) and could potentially lead to 
intended VfM outcomes being compromised (PT04). 
DISCUSSION 
Public Private Partnerships should be based on establishing the ‘right’ working culture 
(Edwards, Bowen and Stewart 2005; National Audit Office 2009, p.55) that is beneficial 
to both partners, and then maintaining good relations (Partnerships Victoria 2003, p.16; 
AECOM 2007, p.75; Ernst & Young 2008, p.13) over the life of the contract to deliver 
agreed outcomes (Weihe in Hodge, Greve and Boardman 2010, p.520). Un-cooperative 
working environments (Klijn and Teisman 2003) often lead to operational difficulties 
between partners, and poor relationships and unsatisfactory performance go ‘hand in 
hand’ (National Audit Office 2009, p.55). Therefore, to achieve VfM outcomes, the 
interview findings show that the public partner should effectively manage the tension 
between partnership management and performance management. In addition to applying 
mechanisms for reducing negative behaviour e.g. abatement, public partner decision-
makers should encourage positive behaviour in their private partner through incentives 
that drive the ‘right performance’ culture. This could be where the private partner goes 
‘above and beyond the call of duty’. Such behaviour may foster a stronger ‘working 
together’ culture between partners. 
Commitment and support from senior public partner management may be needed to 
address under-performance (Harback et al in Chan et al 2004; Hope 2012) or other dif-
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ficulties (Pinto and Slevin 1987) that arise between public and private partners in PPP. 
For the public partner, a contract manager may be supported through the provision of 
additional resources such as more staff or the allocation of more time to review and then 
report upon complex service delivery outcomes (Arthur Andersen and Enterprise LSE 
2000, p.38; Cheng, Li and Love 2000). Interview participants suggest that PPP working 
committees should generally be more supportive of the contract management function 
and recognise that in order to obtain better VfM outcomes, contract management teams 
should be provided with necessary resources. 
A lack of resourcing can make it difficult for public partner contract managers to moni-
tor the effectiveness of private partner performance, particularly over an extended peri-
od of time. Skill limitations (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2007, p.20; Yuan et al 2009; Hope 2012) may also impact on the public partner’s ability 
to effectively manage contracts which may hinder the achievement of VfM outcomes 
(Edwards et al 2004, p.63; Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
2007, p.20) and compromise public safety and satisfaction. The interview findings con-
firm this view. A potential risk for the public partner, in relying too heavily on external 
contractors and consultants, is that they may not adequately transfer appropriate tech-
nical knowledge to public employees, nor do so in a timely way, which may result in 
the public partner paying high market rates for longer than necessary or be left unex-
pectedly to deal with skills-gaps if the external providers should leave suddenly. Alt-
hough weighted towards a compliance-orientated approach to contract management, 
there is merit in using a calendar of deliverables tool to support junior public partner 
contract managers in managing tasks as specified under a concession deed. Such a sys-
tem can be configured to meet the requirements of individual PPP contracts in a way 
that ‘takes users step-by-step through what they need to do, how it should be done and 
when to do it’. 
Conflict between public and private partners may be inevitable (Edwards et al 2004, 
p.55). However, conflict should be managed to reduce animosity and build understand-
ing and trust. Broadly speaking, disagreements arise over timeframes, costs and quality 
issues (Leung et al 2004) as well as project priorities (Hope 2012); manpower re-
sources; and individual or organisational biases or preferences. Interview participants 
point to significant financial impacts/unforeseen cost burdens that can shape public 
partner VfM outcomes, where one partner fails to meet the expectations of the other e.g. 
where the intent of a service specification has been misunderstood or where a KPI has 
not been adequately defined. PPP partners should operate a ‘no blame’ culture. Such a 
mindset can be a more efficient and effective way to overcome obstacles compared with 
apportioning blame to a particular person or party. Issues that are not easily resolved 
should be escalated and managed (as appropriate) with relevant contractual clauses and 
dispute resolution mechanisms. Having occasional or periodic discussions with private 
partner representatives can be valuable for keeping an open dialogue to understand what 
the long-term intentions are that can impact on the contract. 
If KPIs are difficult to measure, they can adversely impact on the public partner’s abil-
ity to successfully monitor and review private partner performance (Evans and Bellamy 
1995). Ideally, but depending upon the nature of the contract, performance ranges for 
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KPIs should be reviewed regularly in conjunction with the private partner. It is therefore 
important to have flexibility between the partners with respect to KPIs to ensure the 
services being delivered actually match those intended as part of the business case; and 
to take necessary steps to address consequential misalignment between expectation and 
practice. From a public partner perspective, the need for change may arise, for example, 
over governance structure inadequacies, trend analysis findings e.g. patterns identified 
in failure event reports/output exception reports, service user complaints, audit findings, 
variations to contractual agreements arising from wider industry drivers e.g. economic 
recession. Changes should be relevant, measurable, repeatable and achievable. 
With regard to threat posed by force majeure events or risk re-allocation, e.g. ‘take-
back’ of services that may lead to variation of a concession deed, business continuity 
plans should be developed to address the issues faced (Partnerships Victoria 2001a, 
p.161) before the risk becomes an event, and to ensure uninterrupted service delivery if 
the event is realised. The public partner should at least obtain from its private partner 
the basis on which the latter’s opinions are formed, the services that are/likely to be af-
fected, how long they are expected to be affected, measures that the consortia will em-
ploy to avoid or minimise disruption (including associated costs), insurance policy de-
tails as well as regular updates on the situation. This information could be used as a 
foundation for activating public partner business continuity plans (as well as documen-
tation received from other relevant sources). If separate from its business continuity 
planning efforts, government should initiate its communication plans to inform key 
stakeholders (including the public) of ongoing developments e.g. service availability 
and risks to public safety. 
For most social infrastructure PPPs, financial incentives are offered to private partner 
operators in the form of regular structured payments from the public partner. Deduc-
tions may be applied (typically due to an accumulation of penalty points which is then 
used to calculate an abatement) for failing to meet KPIs for instances of under-
performance or non-compliance. Such abatements should be consistently applied unless 
there is a properly justified case for not doing so, e.g. to foster positive working rela-
tionships (Ernst & Young 2008, p.13; National Audit Office 2009, p.56). Interview par-
ticipants reason that the decision to apply abatement for under-performance is primarily 
a matter of professional judgement. Knowing when to apply abatement and when to 
allow flexibility can be strategically important with respect to building and maintaining 
effective partnership relations. The rationale for each instance of non-abatement should 
be fully documented to protect against public audit or departmental/external agency 
criticism. Although the concession deed is the reference point and is considered as the 
‘line in the sand’ between the parties when agreement cannot be reached, it should be 
routine to document decisions that vary the administration or implementation of the 
contract. The benefit of effective documentation extends to clearer lines of accountabil-
ity (crucial for the public partner), fewer misunderstandings between partners, and re-
ducing the potential for conflict. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Partnership and performance management are essential elements within a PPP opera-
tional environment. Analysis of interview data, gathered from appropriate experts, con-
firms that aspects of partnership management that are important for public partner gov-
ernance during the operational phase of PPP include: organisational culture; manage-
ment commitment and support; employee capability and expertise; and conflict man-
agement. The important issues for performance management remain as KPI modifica-
tion; contract variation; and penalties and abatements. Risk pervades both management 
perspectives. 
The most significant findings are two-fold. First, there is a link between the public part-
ner’s contract management style for achieving a positive organisational culture and sat-
isfactory delivery of VfM. Organisational culture, however, is not always driven by the 
preferred contract management style of the public partner: ‘you get what you pay for’. 
This suggests that the public partner’s decision-making can be influenced by the size of 
the private partner’s financial margins. 
Second, sufficiently skilled and experienced public partner employees are critical for 
achieving satisfactory VfM outcomes. Failure of governments to attract and retain high 
calibre employees may undermine value for the state in the long term, or lead to an ad-
verse change in the public partner’s risk profile. 
Only by effective management of these partnership and performance issues will the 
public partner, in its governance role, increase the likelihood that intended VfM out-
comes are achieved during the operational phase of PPP projects. Further attention 
could usefully be given to exploring ways in which the public partner can drive opera-
tional performance, but not at the expense of irreparable damage to the partnership rela-
tionship.  
LIMITATIONS AND CONTRIBUTION 
This research focuses on the elements of partnership and performance management in 
the operating phase of PPP. This means that other factors that may contribute towards 
achieving VfM outcomes are not dealt with here. 
The research contributes to the advancement of the ‘body of knowledge’, with respect to 
public partner governance of PPP in the operating phase, by conducting an in-depth 
qualitative study into partnership and performance management. Many of the interview  
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participants have substantial experience working in Australian and international PPP 
markets. Their views carry substantial weight. 
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APPENDIX 1: CATEGORISATION OF NVIVO DATA FOR PARTNERSHIP, PERFORMANCE 
AND RISK MANAGEMENT 
 




Organisational culture   
 Personalities and abilities 7 
 Team working 7 
 Motivation and incentives 29 
 Organisational culture  27 
Mgt commitment and support   
 Mgt commitment and support  9 
Employee capability and expertise   
 
Centralisation of contract manage-
ment 
12 
 Oversight by Treasury - PPP units 18 
 Consultancies 12 
 Employee capability / expertise   33 
Clear and open communication   
 Clear and open communication  9 
Relationship continuity   
 Relationship continuity  12 
Conflict management   





 Conflict management  7 
Performance 
management 




 System types 8 
 Performance mgt  3 
KPI modification   
 KPI modification  13 
Availability/integrity of data   
 Availability/integrity of data  7 




 Performance evaluation 20 
 Opportunity (risk) implementation 8 
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Topic  Parent node Child nodes Number of 
references 
Penalties and abatements   
 Applying penalties and abatements 8 
 Incentive revisions 20 
Risk ma-
nagement 
Implementation of transition plan   
 Implementation of transition plan  6 
Contract variation   
 Modification of existing services 12 
 Re-allocation of risk 7 
 
Business continuity planning modifi-
cation 5 
Consortium/agency authority   
 Consortium/agency authority  13 
Managed termination   
 Service provider failure 3 
 Voluntary termination 5 
 Managed termination  9 
End of concession hand-over   
 End of concession hand-over  5 
Reputation damage   
  Confidentiality 9 
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